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1. Introduction 
The European Commission‟s 2003 Directives on electricity and gas (2003/54/EC and 2003/55/EC 
respectively) required that the Commission carry out a review of their operation by 2006. This review would 
examine experience with the Directives and make recommendations on future policy, particularly whether 
the markets for electricity and gas should be opened further. 
The European Federation of Public Service Unions (EPSU) commissioned the Public Services International 
Research Unit (PSIRU) of the University of Greenwich to carry out its own review of the operation of the 
Directive, which was submitted as evidence to the European Commission in September 2005.1 The objective 
of this report is to review reports on progress with liberalisation published by interested parties since 
September 2005. The report also reviews experience since September 2005 on: 
 Prices; 
 Market concentration; and  
 Quality of supply. 
2. The Review requirement 
The Electricity Directive contained a commitment to a review by 2006 in Article 28 while the Gas Directive 
contained a similar requirement in Article 31. The Electricity Directive required: 
„The Commission shall, no later than 1 January 2006, forward to the European Parliament and Council, a detailed 
report outlining progress in creating the internal electricity market. The report shall, in particular, consider: 
- the existence of non-discriminatory network access;  
- effective regulation;  
- the development of interconnection infrastructure and the security of supply situation in the Community;  
- the extent to which the full benefits of the opening of markets are accruing to small enterprises and households, 
notably with respect to public service and universal service standards;  
- the extent to which markets are in practice open to effective competition, including aspects of market dominance, 
market concentration and predatory or anti-competitive behaviour;  
- the extent to which customers are actually switching suppliers and renegotiating tariffs;  
- price developments, including supply prices, in relation to the degree of the opening of markets;  
- the experience gained in the application of the Directive as far as the effective independence of system operators in 
vertically integrated undertakings is concerned and whether other measures in addition to functional independence 
and separation of accounts have been developed which have effects equivalent to legal unbundling. 
Where appropriate, the Commission shall submit proposals to the European Parliament and the Council, in 
particular to guarantee high public service standards. 
Where appropriate, the Commission shall submit proposals to the European Parliament and the Council, in 
particular to ensure full and effective independence of distribution system operators before 1 July 2007. When 
necessary, these proposals shall, in conformity with competition law, also concern measures to address issues of 
market dominance, market concentration and predatory or anti-competitive behaviour.‟ 
3. Evidence published since September 2005: The European Commission 
3.1. The DG TREN report to the Council and the European Parliament 
In November 2005, the Directorate General for Energy and Transport (DG TREN) of the Commission 
published its first report on progress in creating the internal gas and electricity market2. It found: 
The most important shortcoming on the internal electricity and gas market is the lack of integration of national 
markets. Key indicators in this respect are the absence of price convergence across the EU and the low level of 
cross-border trade. This is generally due to the existence of barriers to entry, inadequate use of existing 
infrastructure and - in the case of electricity - insufficient interconnection between Member States in many cases, 
leading to congestion. Moreover, many national markets display a high degree of concentration of the industry, 
impeding the development of real competition. The gas market continues to suffer from a lack of liquidity of both 
gas and transport capacity. In this context, the effects of long-term gas contracts will have to be taken into account, 
                                                     
1 S Thomas (2005) „The European Union Gas and Electricity Directives‟, EPSU, Brussels. 
http://www.epsu.org/IMG/pdf/Report_EN_Directive_review_final.pdf  
2 Commission of the European Communities (2005) „Report on progress in creating the internal gas and electricity 
market‟ Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, SEC (2005) 1448, COM 
(2005) 568 final, European Commission, Brussels. 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/electricity/report_2005/doc/2005_report_en.pdf  
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both in terms of competition and the fact that such contracts may be necessary to underpin the financing of major 
new gas infrastructure. Another indicator of the lack of real competition is that switching by customers remains 
limited in most Member States and that choosing a new supplier from another Member State remains the exception. 
We can examine the nine topics the Commission is required to report on in order. 
3.1.1. Non-discriminatory access 
On non-discriminatory access, the report finds: 
Network access conditions are still not demonstrably fair and non-discriminatory across all Member States. Indeed 
in almost all Member States there is at least one aspect of network access which is unacceptable for either gas or 
electricity. 
3.1.2. Regulation 
The Commission‟s view on regulators is confused and confusing. It acknowledges that Member States have 
largely complied with the requirements of the Directive but lists 14 areas for concern. These include: 
„regulators are not responsible for setting tariff methodologies for distribution companies below a certain 
threshold with this being done by local government‟, and „regulators are not entitled to specify clear rules for 
cost allocation in the preparation of unbundled accounts‟. Most of the areas of concern reflect the 
Commission‟s perception that regulators do not have enough powers, are not independent of government and 
their methods are not harmonised across the Union. 
3.1.3. Interconnection infrastructure 
For electricity, the Commission finds: „Currently the availability of electricity network capacity for cross 
border transactions is not satisfactory either in terms of new investment or in the way existing capacity is 
allocated.‟ For gas it finds that: „Network users have limited flexibility to change their traditional pattern of 
flows in the network and therefore limited opportunity for competition between the main companies. The 
same applies to the prospect for new entrants who find that there are only a few points in the network where 
capacity can be made available.‟ 
3.1.4. Security of supply 
For electricity, DG TREN is satisfied with the level of generating capacity, stating that: „the supply demand 
balance position is, in fact, developing favourably in most Member States.‟ On electricity networks, the 
Commission comes to no conclusions other than observing that there is wide variation from country to 
country. In fact, data is presented for fewer than half the Member States and for only one indicator. 
For gas, while the report spends some time discussing the challenge of maintain security of supply against a 
back-drop of falling production in member states, it foresees no major problems: „On the basis of the 
information available to the Commission and in the light of ongoing and planned investments, long-term 
security of supply seems to be ensured.‟ 
3.1.5. Are benefits accruing to small users and households? 
Here, the Commission is less optimistic:  
Whilst the rates of larger electricity customers switching continue to rise, gas consumers and small business 
customers and households, in Member States where they have the right to choose, remain reluctant to exercise their 
right to choose. Many factors contribute to this. Often competing offers are unavailable or are too similar to 
constitute a real choice. Dominant positions and insufficient unbundling, especially at the distribution level, seem to 
discourage switching, and changing suppliers is still often perceived as risky 
The Commission regards this as a sign of „a poorly functioning market‟. It clearly assumes that a high level 
of switching indicates that consumers are benefiting from the reforms. 
3.1.6. Are markets open and price developments 
This is clearly a big question that is not amenable to a simple answer but for electricity, the Report states that 
some benefits have been achieved, citing evidence from a Copenhagen Econometrics (CE) Study which 
claimed that electricity prices were 10-20 per cent lower than they would have been without liberalisation. 
Hall was highly critical of the CE study concluding that3: 
                                                     
3 D Hall (2006)‟ Evaluating network services in Europe - a critique of the EC Evaluation of the Performance of 
Network Industries‟, EPSU, Brussels. http://www.epsu.org/a/1994  
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„The EPNI [European Commission‟s evaluation of the performance of network industries] and the CE study fail to 
support the defence that is offered for liberalisation. Without the CE study, the report has very little to offer in 
support of the benefits of liberalisation. The CE results do not stand up to much examination, and certainly do not 
support the claims made for them by the Commission in the EPNI.‟ 
However, it noted the high level of concentration in the sector which it claimed led to a lack of confidence 
that prices were arrived at in a fair way. As argued later, reducing the level of concentration will be 
counterproductive if a genuinely competitive market cannot be achieved. 
For gas, the Copenhagen Econometrics Study was even more optimistic claiming prices were 35 per cent 
lower than they would have been in countries where liberalisation was well advanced. However, the Report 
reports serious concerns about network access and the distorting effect of long-term contracts, and as a 
result, for many countries, „a competitive European market is still not in sight.‟ 
3.1.7. Independence of system operators 
The Commission is critical of Member States‟ implementation of the Directive in this respect stating: 
„unbundling is currently not being implemented in a sufficiently robust manner across all Member States‟. It 
is particularly critical of implementation for distribution system operators threatening: „Unless Member 
States take stronger measures in this regard, so that the requirements that they chose to put on vertically 
integrated companies are fulfilled, the Commission will be obliged itself to take action.‟ 
It lists six criteria for independence of system operators (e.g., existence of unbundled regulatory accounts 
with guidelines) and for electricity transmission system operators, only 13 out of 26 member states meet all 
six criteria, for gas transmission system operators only four countries comply fully, for electricity and gas 
distribution, the number complying is only two and one respectively. 
3.1.8. Environmental consequences 
The DG TREN report does not mention the environment in its report although there is a brief section in the 
Technical Annex. This concludes; 
„There is no reason at all why the opening of the electricity market should have any negative environmental 
consequences provided that the framework for producers and consumers is set in an appropriate way.‟ 
3.1.9. Employment 
The DG TREN report contains no substantive analysis on employment consequences of the Directives 
claiming only that it: „will remain vigilant, in particular regarding the social and employment consequences 
of the restructuring of energy companies, the effect of competitive energy prices on employment in energy 
intensive industries.‟ 
The technical annex contains little more although it does report: 
The employment trends in the energy industry merit wider attention in view of the high level of European legislation 
that now affects this sector. Although it is not the job of the Commission to decide what level and how many 
employees, the right incentives need to be in place for companies to maintain their assets and have a sufficient level 
of qualified employment. 
In view of these questions, the Commission has decided to upgrade the study on employment in the energy sector 
which was first performed in 2001. The Commission has therefore asked consultants to assess the impact on 
employment in EU-25 of the opening of electricity and gas markets and of other key EU directives in the field of 
energy. 
3.2. The Competition Commission Inquiry 
In June 2005 the Commission launched an Energy sector inquiry through the Competition Directorate. The 
final results of the inquiry were expected in 2006. Intermediate results were discussed in an issues paper of 
15 November 20054 and this was followed up by a Preliminary Report in February 20065. The picture 
presented inevitably has much in common with that shown by DG TREN, although, as noted below, there 
are some significant differences. The Preliminary Report lists five main impediments to competition in EU 
                                                     
4 European Commission Competition DG (2005) „Energy sector inquiry: issues paper‟ European Commission, Brussels. 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/others/sector_inquiries/energy/issues_paper15112005.pdf  
5 European Commission Competition DG (2006) „Sector Inquiry under Art 17 Regulation 1/2003 on the gas and 
electricity markets‟ European Commission, Brussels. 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/others/sector_inquiries/energy/#16022006  
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energy markets: market concentration; vertical foreclosure; lack of market integration; lack of transparency; 
and price formation. 
3.2.1. Market concentration 
For market concentration, the report focuses particularly on the wholesale sector. For gas, it identifies the 
low liquidity of the spot markets, the pre-existence of long-term gas supply contracts that allow little scope 
for new entrants and insufficient unbundling of network activities. For electricity, the report is also critical of 
the liquidity of spot markets and that markets remain essentially national in character. 
3.2.2. Vertical foreclosure 
For gas, where the producers remain largely separate from the retailers, the report repeats its concerns on 
long-term contracts and inadequate unbundling. For electricity, the report cites vertical integration of 
generation and retail, which it says are a disincentive to trading on the wholesale markets. Inadequate 
unbundling of network activities is also mentioned. 
3.2.3. Market integration 
For both gas and electricity, the report suggests the lack of cross-border trade, due to inadequate capacity or 
inability of new entrants to access available capacity, contributes to the lack of competitive pressure on the 
incumbents. 
3.2.4. Transparency 
The report is critical of the lack of market information for both gas and electricity. For gas, the report also 
cites the lack of information on access to networks, transit capacity and storage capacity. For electricity, the 
concerns are similar with additional worries about reserve and balancing power and also the lack of 
harmonisation from state to state. 
3.2.5. Price formation 
The report highlights a lack of trust in price-setting. For gas, there is concern about indexation to oil prices 
which it claims means the gas price is not sensitive supply and demand conditions for gas, while for 
electricity, the report mentions the co-existence of free markets and regulated markets. 
3.3. The EC Presidency 
A third Commission perspective came from the European Commission President, Manuel Barroso, in 
September 20066. He said: „In energy terms I can tell you that I am more convinced than ever that we need 
new legislation concerning regulation. What we know is that the status quo isn't working. What we have to 
do is decide how we can most effectively reform the system to the benefit of business and consumers‟. 
However, unlike other pro-competition advocates, he believes competition can be made to work simply by 
enforcing a full unbundling of network activities: „The bundling of generation, supply, pipelines, grids and 
distribution seems to be at the heart of the current failure.‟ Concentration and integration in the generation 
and retail sector would not be halted. The Financial Times reported that: „Aides say he wants to create a 
framework where perhaps four or five big pan-European energy companies compete across borders for retail 
customers and carry enough clout to drive hard bargains with suppliers.‟ He was also reported to be 
considering introducing a new pan-European energy regulator. 
3.4. Assessment of DG TREN and DG Competition reports and the Presidency’s position 
The EPSU report listed six major reasons why free markets in gas and electricity were not achievable, 
regardless of whether they were desirable. These were; 
1. Inability to store power and expense of storing gas, which means stocks cannot be used to dampen 
price movements; 
2. Need for supply and demand to match at all times, which will mean prices will be very volatile in a 
market because of the huge cost of system failure; 
3. Lack of substitutes, which means consumers cannot easily respond to price signals; 
4. Vital role in modern society; 
5. Electricity and gas are standard products and a market will force prices down to an unsustainable 
level; and 
6. Environmental impacts of gas and electricity production and use. 
                                                     
6 Financial Times, „Barroso plans energy sector reforms‟ September 12, 2006, p 12. 
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The EPSU position paper7 supported these conclusions and included evidence from the USA arguing that the 
2003 Blackout in the North East was a direct result of liberalisation measures. 
Neither the DG TREN, nor the DG Competition is prepared even to acknowledge that these are legitimate 
issues that must be addressed and they both totally fail to address them. 
Even if it is assumed that these six issues can be overcome or are not significant, this does not answer the 
other fundamental question: is a free market in both electricity and gas a better way to organise these 
industries than a regulated monopoly? Again, neither the DG TREN, nor the DG Competition is prepared 
even to acknowledge that this is a legitimate question and they both totally fail to address this question. 
There is little disagreement on the basic facts about progress with the Directives from all sides. The 
following basic points are widely agreed, even though, as argued later, the actions required are much more 
controversial: 
 The corporate structure is highly concentrated and mergers and acquisitions mean concentration is 
increasing; 
 Wholesale markets lack liquidity and consequently are not trusted nor do they provide reliable price 
signals; 
 Long-term contracts in gas and vertical integration of generation and retail in electricity mean there 
is little scope for the wholesale markets; 
 Small consumers are generally not interested in switching their retail supplier; 
 In many countries, there is little corporate separation between ownership of competitive activities, 
and ownership of the network and the system operator functions; and 
 Most electricity and gas markets remain national in scope with limited trade between countries and 
little scope for consumers to buy directly from foreign-based retailers. 
3.4.1. Differences of emphasis 
While there is, not surprisingly, a great deal of common ground between the two reports, there are some 
significant differences of emphasis particularly on vertical foreclosure of markets. The Competition 
Directorate report identifies „vertical foreclosure‟ of markets – integration of generation and retail in 
electricity and long-term contracts for gas - as a major obstacle to the creation of efficient markets. 
Electricity 
While the DG TREN report comments extensively on long-term gas contracts, it has almost nothing to say 
on integration of generation and retail. The report merely states: 
In certain electricity markets there also seems to be a tendency towards growing vertical integration between 
generation and supply activities, which might lead to a reduction of liquidity on the wholesale markets concerned, 
aggravating the risks associated with concentration. 
However, the report does not explain why this entirely predictable development was not anticipated in either 
the 1996 or 2003 Electricity Directives, nor what measures might be taken to counter it. Integration of 
generation and retail has compelling strategic advantages for electricity companies. In an integrated 
company, the generation sector will be able to sell much of its output directly to final consumers rather than 
through a wholesale market. Large final consumers are generally on at least an annual contract while most 
small consumers seldom if ever change supplier. This makes demand relatively easy to predict at least one 
year forward. By contrast, wholesale markets are generally operated on a 30 minute basis so companies will 
have to compete continuously to sell their power. Effectively, companies selling through an efficient and 
liquid wholesale market would not know how much power they would sell and what price they would 
receive from one hour to the next. For the retail business, integration makes the cost of power purchase much 
more predictable and means companies are much less exposed to a volatile wholesale market where they 
might have to pay higher costs than they can recover from their consumers. 
While integration of generation and retail has compelling advantages to companies, reducing the risk of both 
their retail and generation businesses, the impact on the competitiveness of the markets is adverse. The 
wholesale market ceases to be an important price-setting arena in integrated markets and the barriers to entry 
for new retailers and generators will be formidable in a strongly integrated market. New generators will have 
no market in which to sell their power, while new retailers will have no market from which to buy power. 
                                                     
7 EPSU (2005) „EPSU Contribution to the Progress Report on the Internal Market for Electricity and Gas‟ EPSU, 
Brussels. http://www.epsu.org/IMG/pdf/EN_Adopted_Comments_on_future_of_EU_int_mkt_gas_electricity-2.pdf  
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These characteristics were clearly illustrated in the UK. A decision in 1998 to allow integration of generation 
and retail quickly led to the takeover of all 14 major retailers by just 5 large generation companies and led to 
the bankruptcy of all independent generators except those with long-term contracts with integrated 
companies. Of the 5 large integrated companies, three are subsidiaries of the three dominant electricity 
companies in Europe, EDF (France) and the two German companies, E.ON and RWE. 
The major positive aspect of integration of retail and generation is that it may help ensure there is sufficient 
generating capacity. As California found to its cost in 2001, a de-integrated system gives generators no 
obligation or even incentive to ensure there is sufficient generating capacity. Given the high barriers to entry 
for new generators, generators make higher profits from a shortage of capacity, which leads to high prices 
than they would from fully satisfying demand. At least with integrated companies, they would have an 
incentive to ensure that their own consumers received reliable and affordable supplies of electricity. While 
reliable supplies, albeit from an uncompetitive market structure may be preferable to unreliable supplies 
from a more competitive market structure, it is hardly ideal. We return to the issue of supply security later. 
Gas 
The DG TREN report does seem to acknowledge that long-term arrangements might be a necessary to ensure 
security of supply. For example, it states: „In view of the increasingly tighter supply-demand situation in 
some Member States, arrangements have been introduced or are being introduced with a view to setting up a 
supplier of last resort and/or long-term planning. By these means, possible security of supply problems are 
anticipated and addressed.‟ It is hard to avoid the impression that DG TREN is trying to „have its cake and 
eat it‟ here – it wants the competitiveness of a market and the certainty of planning. Either the wholesale gas 
business is organised as a market or it is subject to long-term planning, the two options are mutually 
exclusive. 
The Competition Directorate report is similarly ambiguous. It consistently cites long-term contracts as a 
barrier to competition, yet it appears to acknowledge the need for long-term contracts to make financing 
feasible: „A number of projects are already underway either to construct new transport infrastructure (for 
instance the BBL interconnector from the Netherlands to the UK) or to upgrade existing infrastructure by 
increasing its capacity128. Since such projects require significant capital investment, the nature of the 
financing arrangements is crucial in order to ensure their viability. Typically, project developers attempt to 
mitigate their risk by long-term contracts, guaranteeing the developers sufficient future revenue to meet the 
costs of financing the project. It is important, therefore, that the regulatory regime strike a balance between 
providing the right incentives to build new capacity and ensuring that any long-term contracts do not have 
detrimental effects on competition.‟ 
Both the DG TREN and Competition Directorate report acknowledge that the UK wholesale market is the 
only liquid gas market in Europe. Wright, in his detailed analysis of the UK gas industry8, agrees that the UK 
wholesale gas market is working well. However, he argues that it is precisely because the market is working 
well that prices are highly volatile and insecurity has increased. He argues that arrangements that were 
previously carried out by administrative means, for example, system balancing, are now carried out via 
markets and potential insecurities are immediately translated into very high prices. He totally rejects the 
widely propagated suggestion that volatility and high prices for gas in the UK were due to the failure of the 
rest of Europe to liberalise. He argues that if gas industries in other European countries were to be as 
competitive as the UK, prices in their markets would become as volatile as those in the UK. 
3.5. Issues not addressed 
Whilst both reports include a large amount of evidence, what is most notable is the range of issues that they 
do not address or address inadequately. These include: 
 Is a free market in gas and electricity compatible with security of supply? 
 Will a free market in gas and electricity provide consumers with lower and more stable energy prices 
than a regulated monopoly? 
 Will a free market in gas and electricity allow the poorest consumers to receive energy supplies at 
fair prices? 
 Will a free market in gas and electricity allow environmental objectives, especially those on 
greenhouse gas emissions, to be met? 
                                                     
8 P Wright (2006) „Gas prices in the UK: Markets and insecurity of supply‟, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
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The other three factors are far less obvious. Lack of „market integration‟ refers to the lack of interconnecting 
capacity between member states. In an efficient market, the existence of a high level of interconnector 
capacity between countries should increase competition because it will allow foreign-based companies easy 
access to export markets. However, interconnectors are generally very expensive to build, especially 
undersea cables, and they are often environmentally controversial providing visual intrusion in remote 
unspoilt regions. 
DG TREN does not seem to understand that there would only be scope to generate large price differences if 
the wholesale market was not working well. If the wholesale market is efficient, the wholesale price is likely 
to be very similar for all competing retailers, as it is in other commodity markets while network charges 
should be the same for all companies. This effectively leaves only the retail element of the bill for companies 
to compete over. Since the retail element represents only a small part of the overall cost, it is likely that 
competing offers will be similar. Nor does DG TREN even countenance the idea that consumers simply do 
not want choice in this sector. 
The issue of integration of retail and generation, a development that if allowed would inevitably mean that 
wholesale markets would have little significance and would mean barriers to entry for new generators and 
retailers would probably be insuperable is barely touched. The report states: 
In certain electricity markets there also seems to be a tendency towards growing vertical integration between 
generation and supply activities, which might lead to a reduction of liquidity on the wholesale markets concerned, 
aggravating the risks associated with concentration. 
However, the report does not explain why this entirely predictable development was not anticipated in either 
the first Directives (1996 for electricity and 1998 for gas) or their 2003 replacements, nor what measures 
might be taken to counter it. 
On security of supply, DG TREN apparently believes that its Directive on Security of Supply will solve any 
problems:  
Under this directive [Security of Supply], which has to be implemented by the end of 2007, Member States will 
provide for a reliable regulatory framework conducive to new investment in both electricity generation and 
infrastructure. 
DG TREN does not examine the risk that measures that will ensure adequacy of generating capacity are 
incompatible with a free market. 
The Commission is complacent on the employment consequences of liberalisation. Given that EPSU 
estimates that more than 300,000 jobs have been lost in the European Union electricity sector since 1990, it 
is hard to see how the Commission can justify its claim that it has been „vigilant‟ in monitoring employment 
effects. The loss of 300,000 jobs has clearly provoked no actions by the Commission so it is not clear what 
practical value the Commission remaining vigilant has unless its vigilance is backed by a willingness to act. 
The Commission is equally complacent on environmental issues. It does not acknowledge any problems to 
date, nor does it anticipate any. 
3.6. The Presidency 
Comments by the Presidency reinforce perceptions of the Commission‟s views, that it is entirely comfortable 
with markets dominated by oligopolies, partly because it allows European „Champions‟ to emerge and partly 
on a (mistaken) view that it can control oligopolies.9 A pan-European regulator if given significant powers 
would be even more remote and unaccountable than the existing national regulatory bodies. It would be 
highly unlikely to be politically acceptable to member states, which would see it as usurping powers and 
decisions that should be rightly exercised at the national level. 
4. Other bodies 
4.1. The European Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas (ERGEG)10 
ERGEG was set up under the terms of the Directives11 and in December 2005, published its own review of 
the European energy market12. The report finds: 
                                                     
9 For example, see S Thomas. The seven brothers. Energy Policy 2003; 31(5): 393-403. 
10 http://www.ergeg.org/portal/page/portal/ERGEG_HOME/ERGEG  
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It is the extent of customers‟ benefits and confidence in the market which decides the success or failure of the 
liberalization project. In efficiency terms production and wholesale competition influence the majority of added 
value, and wholesale markets influence the success of cross-border competition. However, competition in retail 
markets decides the distribution of these benefits between generators and shippers, retailers, and customers. In light 
of recent record profits of many incumbents and the sharp increase in energy prices there is a growing public 
sentiment that currently the majority of benefits are not passed on to customers but remain with the incumbent 
undertakings.  
Two out of three of the main critical points it identifies relate to the powers available to regulators. The report states: 
„Nevertheless, it is possible to identify some critical points delaying or hampering the development of more 
efficient and integrated electricity and gas markets in Europe. These points are related to:  
 a) inappropriate or insufficient legal and/or regulatory provisions;  
 b) excessive market power; and 
 c) insufficient independence and/or capacity of regulatory authorities.‟ 
Like the Commission reports, the ERGEG report cites inadequate unbundling, poor liquidity in wholesale markets, 
corporate concentration, lack of mobility amongst household consumers and lack of transparency in markets. 
4.2. The Council of European Energy Regulators (CEER)13 
The CEER describes itself as a "not for profit association" which brings together the independent national 
energy regulators from the Member States of the European Union (EU) and European Economic Area 
(EEA). Its membership is largely the same as that of ERGEG, but with the addition of Norway and Iceland 
and the omission of Luxembourg. 
It issued a response to the Competition Directorate‟s Preliminary Report of the Gas and Electricity Sector 
Inquiry14. It agrees fully with the analysis of the Competition Directorate and proposes the following 
measures: 
 Review (implicitly increase) the powers of the regulatory bodies; 
 Strengthen unbundling measures; 
 Increase transparency of markets; 
 Establish regional markets as a stepping-stone to a single European market. 
4.3. The Union of the Electricity Industry, EURELECTRIC15 
EURELECTRIC is the association that represents the European electricity industry companies. In April 
2006, it provided comments on the DG Competition sector inquiry16. It concluded that the preliminary report 
                                                                                                                                                                                
11 Article 16 of the Electricity Directive states: „The Commission has indicated its intention to set up a European 
Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas which would constitute a suitable advisory mechanism for encouraging 
cooperation and coordination of national regulatory authorities, in order to promote the development of the internal 
market for electricity and gas, and to contribute to the consistent application, in all Member States, of the provisions set 
out in this Directive and Directive 2003/55/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 
concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas and in Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 on conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in 
electricity. 
12 European Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas (2005) „A Preliminary Assessment of the European Energy 
Market by the European Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas (ERGEG)‟, E05-REP-03-04, Brussels. 
http://www.ergeg.org/portal/page/portal/ERGEG_HOME/ERGEG_DOCS/NATIONAL_REPORTS/E05-REP-03-
04_ERGEG_ASSESSMENT_20-12-2005.PDF 
13 http://www.ceer-eu.org/portal/page/portal/CEER_HOME  
14 Council of European Energy Regulators „CEER response to the Preliminary Report of the Gas and Electricity Sector 
Inquiry‟, CEER, Brussels. 
http://www.ceer-eu.org/portal/page/portal/CEER_HOME/CEER_PUBLICATIONS/CEER_DOCUMENTS/C06-GA-
21-06_DGCOMP-SI.pdf 
15 http://www.eurelectric.org/  
16 EURELECTRIC (2006) „Union of the Electricity Industry - EURELECTRIC contribution to the consultation on the 
sector inquiry‟ EURELECTRIC, Brussels. 
http://public.eurelectric.org/3/CPKJNIMDPNFOAJGGGKHKKIBE5HUOY66O4NHLVHY6U286YBFGI4O3PDBN9
67K9DBDW3P3TE4Q/eurelectric/docs/DLS/ContribtosectorinquiryFINAL-2006-394-0001-2-.pdf  
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was: „a good analysis of the energy markets and a sound basis to discuss the way forward.‟ Its report is 
structured around the concerns raised by the DG Competition Report. 
4.3.1. Market concentration 
EURELECTRIC acknowledges the high level of market concentration but recommends increasing market 
size from national to regional markets and finally to a Single Market. 
4.3.2. Vertical foreclosure 
 EURELECTRIC claims that vertical foreclosure is not the actual problem, but a symptom of the real 
problem, which is lack of liquidity in wholesale markets. 
4.3.3. Market integration 
EURELECTRIC agrees that market integration (between national markets) would improve the integration of 
national markets and help form a Single Market. However, it claims that the problem is often not lack of 
interconnector capacity lack of market-based mechanisms for management of interconnection capacity. 
4.3.4. Lack of transparency 
EURELECTRIC claims lack of transparency erodes confidence in prices and calls for „data for generation, 
load, balancing and reserve power, transmission and access to interconnectors, and wholesale 
markets‟ to be made publicly available 
4.3.5. Price formation 
EURELECTRIC advocates the removal of all remaining regulated tariffs. It discusses the European Union 
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS) and recommends that it be allowed time to work and not be distorted 
by „regulatory interference, as is starting to be the case in some countries.‟ The electricity industry 
„acknowledges the demands of large customers for long-term contracts and is ready to discuss ways to 
diversify the range of supply contracts offered to large industrial customers.‟ However, it states: „Long-
term contracts should be based on market terms and conditions.‟ 
4.4. Eurogas17 
Eurogas has not responded in detail to the DG TREN and DG Competition but it did produce a brief paper 
on the DG Competition Inquiry in June 200618 and a short paper on the future European gas market in July 
200619. 
Eurogas is broadly supportive of the Inquiry and stresses the need to implement the Gas Directive, but it is 
critical of the DG Competition‟s criticism of contracting in the gas industry. It claims that flexible contracts 
(which the Commission believes prevent buyers from using the spot market) and take-or-pay contracts are 
necessary, the latter to allow long-term investments in gas supply and transport. 
The paper on he future gas market contains rather bland recommendations that few would disagree on, for 
example, rules should be transparent and clear, LNG is a useful option for future supply and security of 
supply is important to consumers. It does however conclude by again stressing the need for long-term, take-
or-pay contracts, whilst still supporting the need for a more liquid market. 
5. Prices 
Along with service quality, prices are the main criterion by which consumers judge the effectiveness of the 
reforms included in the Directives. However, the method of organisation of the sector is one of several 
factors that impact on the prices paid by consumers. Other important factors include international fossil fuel 
prices, particularly for coal and gas, the need for investment for example, to deal with a backlog in 
investment or reduce the environmental impact of the sector. Movements in prices therefore are not by 
themselves a reliable indicator of the success of reforms. As a minimum, if conclusions are to be drawn on 
price movements, they must be based on a „counterfactual‟, that is, a projection of what prices would have 
been had the reforms not taken place. Better still, the comparison should be with what the impact of 
                                                     
17 http://www.eurogas.org/  
18 http://www.eurogas.org/database/documents/06L389_Eurogas_position_on_sector_enquiry.pdf  
19 http://www.eurogas.org/database/documents/06NO343(2)%20-%20The%20European%20Gas%20Market%20-
%20Eurogas%20views%20on%20the%20way%20forward.pdf  
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alternative reform policies would have been. However, such comparisons are complex and the results seldom 
unequivocal. Projecting what would have happened is not something that can be done with any certainty. 
There has been a tendency amongst those promoting the reforms to attribute price reductions to the impact of 
liberalisation and to attribute price increases either to other factors or to imperfections in the market. 
In January 2006, EPSU published an analysis of evidence published on electricity price movements in the 
European Union
20
. It concluded: 
„Despite assertions by the European Commission and EURELECTRIC that electricity liberalization has 
resulted in significant price reductions for consumers, the evidence as produced, for example, by KEMA 
and the Commission itself does not support these assertions. The price reductions that have occurred in 
the past decade took place mostly in the period 1995-2000, before liberalization was effective in most of 
the European Union and since then, prices have risen steeply, in many cases wiping out the gains of the 
earlier period. Other factors, not properly accounted for, such as fossil fuel price movements, 
technological innovations and changes to regulatory practices are more likely to have led to the price 
reductions that occurred in the period 1995-200 than reforms that had not then taken effect. 
The liberalized model is now facing its most severe test to date. If it cannot cope well with volatile fossil 
fuel prices and if the market does not stimulate enough investment to prevent the apparent looming 
capacity shortages in much of the EU, the model will have failed. The unproven nature of the model 
makes morality of the Energy Ministers recommending the export of this model to neighbouring countries 
highly questionable.‟ 
5.1. Recent experience of prices 
Electricity and gas prices have increased sharply in the past two years. European Commission figures show 
that, from January 1 2005 to January 1 2006, gas prices for household consumers rose by 16 per cent and for 
industrial consumers by 33 per cent. Electricity prices for household consumers rose by 5 per cent and for 
industrial consumers by 16 per cent in the same period. However, these averages conceal wide variations 
particularly between regions. To make more sense of the figures, it is useful to divide the countries into 
regions (see Table 1). This allows differences in the state of liberalisation, resource endowments and fuel 
sources to be identified. 
The main region is Central Europe, which includes the five largest countries in the EU. In some countries 
such as the UK, Austria and the Netherlands, the Directives have been most fully implemented, and in these 
countries there are no longer regulated tariffs for any class of consumer. However, other countries, such as 
France and Italy are proceeding at the minimum pace with implementation of the Directive and all other 
countries have regulated tariffs for at least some classes of consumer for electricity or gas. This is a 
considerable annoyance to DG TREN, which states in its review21: 
„Although the retaining of controls may be justified in a period of transition, these will increasingly cause distortions 
as the need for investment approaches. It is debateable whether some of the price controls currently being imposed 
are consistent with Article 3(2) of the Directives where the requirement for “equality of access for EU 
[electricity/gas] companies to national consumers. Member States and Regulators should examine this issue 
closely.‟ 
The regulated tariffs have been particularly problematic in Spain, where regulated tariffs are below the 
market levels and the company divisions set up to supply the „free market‟ have all closed down. While the 
need to protect consumers from the huge price increases that occurred in the Nordic market in 2002/03 and 
in the UK in 2006 is understandable, the co-existence of regulated and market tariffs for the same set of 
consumers is not desirable. The Commission would clearly like to see the removal of regulated tariffs at the 
earliest opportunity. The alternative, that the „free market‟ is undesirable and that the EU should return to a 
system of regulated tariffs for final consumers is clearly not one that the Commission has contemplated. 
In this region, the UK stands out, particularly with electricity as showing the largest price increases whereas 
increases in France and Italy, where regulated tariffs exist still, are generally below the average. 
                                                     
20 S Thomas (2006) „Recent evidence on the impact of electricity liberalisation on consumer prices‟ EPSU, Brussels. 
http://www.epsu.org/IMG/pdf/EN_PSIRU_paper_Elec_prices.pdf  
21 http://ec.europa.eu/energy/electricity/report_2005/doc/2005_report_technical_annex.pdf  
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In the Nordic region, electricity price increases are very much lower, reflecting the recovery of water stocks 
after the shortages in 2003/04 which led to huge increases in electricity prices. If the huge wholesale price 
increases that occurred in summer of 2006 are sustained and passed through to consumers, the picture for 
2006 could be very different with large price increases being imposed on consumers. Apart from in 
Denmark, the gas industries are too small for the figures to be significant. 
Table 1.  Price rises for electricity and gas from Jan1 2005 to Jan 1 2006 
 Electricity household Electricity industry Gas household Gas industry 
Belgium -2.6 (Y) 25.0 22.4 (Y) 33.6 
Germany 2.6 (Y) 10.0 17.8 30.6 
Spain 4.6 (Y) 5.0 (Y) 14.5 (Y) 54.7 (Y) 
France 1.0 (Y) 0 10.9 (Y) 28.8 
Italy 7.0 (Y) 10.5 (Y) 7.6 (Y) 15.2 
Netherlands 6.8 6.4 11.5 19.8 
Austria -5.2 4.4 17.1 32.1 
UK 14.2 36.2 11.4 48.4 
Central Europe 4.0 12.2 14.2 32.9 
     
Denmark 4.0 (Y) 12.4 (Y) 5.2 (Y) 3.0 (Y) 
Finland 2.0 (Y*) -1.7 - 12.7 (n.a.) 
Sweden 5.7 30.5 20.3 37.2 
Norway -4.5 -2.6 - - 
Nordic Region 1.8 9.6 12.7 17.6 
     
Greece 1.9 (Y) 3.6 (Y) - - 
Ireland 3.8 (Y) 8.7 (Y) 25.3 (Y) - (Y) 
Luxembourg 8.5 (Y) 5.1 26.9 29.6 
Portugal 2.8 (Y) 14.5 (Y) 17.7 (n.a.) 26.5 (n.a.) 
Small/peripheral 4.2 8.0 23.3 28.0 
     
Czech Rep 7.6 (Y) 15.3 26.8 (Y) 36.2 
Hungary 2.7 (Y) 9.1 (Y) 21.6 (Y) 32.9 (Y) 
Poland 4.7 (Y) 6.8 (Y) 17.3 (Y) 19.4 (Y) 
Slovenia 1.4 (Y) 6.4 25.6 (Y) 35.1 
Slovak Rep 7.1 (Y) 10.7 29.9 (Y) 46.4 
Bulgaria 2.4 (n.a.) 7.1 (n.a.) 14.4 (n.a.) 19.2 (n.a.) 
Croatia 6.2 (n.a.) 4.8 (n.a.) 0 (n.a.) 0 (n.a.) 
Romania 37.5 (n.a.) -4.0 (n.a.) 20.7 (n.a.) 30.8 (n.a.) 
Eastern Europe 8.6 7.0 19.5 27.5 
     
Estonia 7.8 (Y) 8.3 (Y) 0.1 (Y) 3.4 
Latvia 0 (Y) 0 (Y) 17.7 (Y) 16.5 (Y) 
Lithuania 0 (Y) 0 (Y)  15.3 (Y) 23.5 
Baltic States 2.6 2.8 11.0 14.5 
     
Cyprus 31.4 (Y) 38.4 (Y) - - 
Malta 23.3 (Y) 0 (Y) - - 
Mediterranean 27.4 19.2 - - 
Source: For electricity price information http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-NQ-06-011/EN/KS-
NQ-06-011-EN.PDF, for gas price information http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-NQ-06-
010/EN/KS-NQ-06-010-EN.PDF  and for information on existence of regulated tariffs 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/electricity/report_2005/doc/2005_report_technical_annex.pdf  
Notes. 
1. No information on prices of gas was published for Norway, Greece, Cyprus and Malta. For Ireland, only prices for 
residential consumers were published and for Finland only information for industrial consumers was published. 
2. For countries with entries marked (Y), a regulated tariff still exists. 
3. No information was published on whether regulated tariffs exist in Bulgaria, Croatia, and Romania and for gas 
consumers in Portugal and Finland. 
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For the small and peripheral countries and for the Baltic States, where regulated tariffs exist for electricity 
consumers, price rises are generally lower than in Central Europe, particularly Greece, Ireland and Portugal, 
where a single large company still dominates. For the peripheral countries, the gas industries are too small 
for the figures to be significant. The Baltic States buy all their gas from Russia and prices depend on political 
agreements with Russia. 
For Eastern European electricity regulated prices exist for most markets. Apart from Romania, where some 
adjustment process appears to be taking place, price increases are generally lower than in Central Europe. 
For gas, if we discount Croatia, where a price freeze appeared to be in place, price rises are at least as high as 
in Central Europe, perhaps reflecting higher prices from Russia, the dominant supplier in the region. 
5.2. Price movements in the Germany 
Price rises have been less spectacular in 2006 than in the UK and the Nordic region but have caused political 
concern at the highest level. At the Leipzig futures exchange, electricity prices in August 2006 were quoted 
at 16 per cent higher than the same month of 2005. The German Economy Minister, Michael Glos, envisaged 
bringing in new regulations to the sector22: 
'We need special rules for the energy sector. It is obvious that the wholesale prices in electricity have risen a lot 
more than the increases in costs to produce electricity.‟ 
Glos said he was aiming to change the laws governing competition barriers in order to ensure that the 
supervisory agency can perform 'efficiently' to control market abuses. E.ON‟s chief executive Wulf 
Bernotat‟s response was that German utilities were being unfairly targeted by the politicians over rising 
energy prices23: 
'They are turning the energy industry into a scapegoat for disappointments that have arisen as a result of false 
expectations associated with the liberalisation of the energy market'. 
5.3. Price movements in the UK 
It is useful to focus on the UK as the country to have fulfilled most completely the terms of the Gas and 
Electricity Directives. Table 2 shows that the 2005 price rises shown in Table 1 were not just an 
unrepresentative year. Indeed, price rises since the beginning of 2006 have escalated, with two suppliers‟ 
(EDF and Npower) gas prices going up by more than a half and one electricity supplier‟s (NPower) prices 
going up by 40 per cent (NPower‟s November 2005 increase came into force in January 2006).  By 
September 2006, all suppliers had increased their prices at least twice in 2006 and there are strong rumours 
that there will be further price rises in autumn 2006.  
Care should be taken in drawing a conclusion as to which is the cheapest supplier as the Table shows 
increases, not absolute prices. The companies with the lowest cumulative price rises may be ones that put up 
their prices just before the start of 2004 or which are expecting to put up their prices after September 2006. 
However, the apparent finding that Scottish & Southern has put up its prices much less than its competitors 
seems well-founded. Alone amongst the big six energy retailers in Britain, they appear to have chosen not to 
have matched other suppliers‟ price rises. In doing so, Citigroup calculated S&SE will lose about £1.2bn in 
revenue up to April 2007, a figure described by Citigroup as „staggeringly high‟. They estimated it would 
take 16 years for the company to recover these lost revenues assuming that none of the 2 million [the 
consumers it had gained by keeping prices low] left. This is seen as a long-term strategy to win and retain 
consumers and it remains to be seen whether shareholders will take a long enough view of the company to 
tolerate these lost profits. 
This Table exposes the folly of consumer competition for small consumers, especially the advice of 
consumer organisations, the regulator and the government to switch to the cheapest supplier. Apart from the 
large expense of switches, met by all consumers, it is clear that the cheapest supplier at any one time is likely 
to be the cheapest supplier for only a short period of time. Unless consumers are prepared to switch, say, 
every three months, they will soon not have the cheapest deal. After the September 2006 price increase by 
Npower, the Allan Asher, the Chief Executive of the government sponsored energy consumer organisation, 
                                                     
22 AFX, September 8, 2006. 
23 AFX, September 13, 2006. 
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Energywatch, acknowledged that „the price rises showed competition in the utility market was not working, 
and urged policymakers to examine “what has gone wrong with the UK model”.24‟ 
Table 2.  Price rises imposed by UK energy suppliers from January 2004 to September 2006 (%) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total 
B Gas        
Gas 12.4 (8/4) 14.2 (8/5) 22 (2/6) 12.4 (7/6)   76.0 
Electricity 9.4 (8/4) 14.2 (9/5) 22 (2/6) 9.4 (7/6)   66.7 
EDF        
Gas 4.6 (2/4) 3.5 (8/4) 8.1 (1/5) 12.0 (7/5) 14.7 (2/6) 19.0 (7/6) 78.9 
Electricity 6.7 (2/4) 3.8 (8/4) 5.4 (1/5) 10.7 (7/5) 4.7 (2/6) 8.0 (7/6) 46.0 
NPower        
Gas 5.2 (1/4) 12.0 (9/4) 14.5 (11/5) 15.0 (3/6) 17.2 (9/6)  81.8 
Electricity 5.8 (1/4) 7.6 (9/4) 13.6 (11/5) 13.4 (3/6) 9.9 (9/6)  61.2 
Powergen        
Gas 4.9 (1/4) 3.1 (6/4) 9.6 (11/4) 11.9 (7/5) 24.4 (2/6) 18.4 (8/6) 95.4 
Electricity 6.9 (1/4)  8.9 (11/4) 7.2 (7/5) 18.4 (2/6) 9.7 (8/6) 62.1 
S Power        
Gas 11.8 (9/4) 2.5-5.0 (3/5) 12.0 (10/5) 15.0 (2/6) 17.0 (6/6)  72.7-76.9 
Electricity 9.0 (9/4)  5.0-8.0 (10/5) 8.0 (2/6) 10.0 (6/6)  36.0-39.9 
S&SE        
Gas 9.0 (6/4) 9.1 (2/5) 13.6 (11/5) 16.5 (3/6)   57.4 
Electricity 4.0 (6/4) 6.7 (2/5) 8.9-12.0 (11/5) 9.4 (3/6)   32.2-36.0 
Source: Author‟s research 
Notes 
1. Dates shown are when the price rise was announced. 
2. Scottish Power‟s (S Power) and Scottish & Southern Energy‟s (S&SE) gas and electricity price increases have varied 
according to the region (whether it was their former home region) and method of payment. 
5.4. Impact of increased energy prices on fuel poverty in the UK 
Fuel poverty is defined as the need to spend more than 10 per cent of income on fuel. Clearly, a likely 
doubling of energy prices in only two years is likely to have a serious impact on the number consumers 
suffering from fuel poverty. UK government figures show that in 2004, before the large increases in energy 
prices took place, about 2 million households (1.5 million vulnerable households) in the UK suffered from 
fuel poverty, compared to 6.5 million in 199625. However, much of this reduction was due to reductions in 
energy prices, since then reversed so it is likely that the number of households suffering from fuel poverty is 
rising again, making the government‟s objective of eradicating fuel poverty for vulnerable households by 
2010 and for all households by 2016 hard to achieve unless there are significant reductions in energy prices. 
Fuel poverty is a complex subject involving considerations of social security, measures to improve the 
housing stock for vulnerable consumers, etc. However, the specific impact of liberalisation concerns whether 
it is likely to have raised prices in general and whether it has raised prices particularly for poor consumers. 
The issue of whether it has raised prices above the level they would have been had liberalisation not occurred 
is a complex one that requires a construction of a counterfactual but the specific issue of how far it has 
affected poor consumers in particular is more easily addressed given that a large proportion of poor 
consumers use pre-payment meters. The report for EPSU showed that consumers on pre-payment meters 
paid significantly more for their energy than those paying by other means. The UK government estimates 
that about a quarter of those suffering from fuel poverty have some form of pre-payment meter 
Pre-payment meters raise a number of issues, particularly the extent that pre-payment meters disguise the 
extent of disconnections – the number of consumers that disconnect themselves (because they can‟t afford to 
pay) is very difficult to estimate. The number of consumers using pre-payment meters rose sharply after 
liberalisation reaching about 3.5 million electricity consumers and about 1 million gas consumers by 1996. In 
the past year or two, since prices began to rise, the numbers have increased sharply and by 2005, government 
                                                     
24 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/5324794.stm   
25 Department of Trade and Industry (2006) „The UK fuel poverty strategy: fourth annual progress report 2006‟ DTI, 
London. http://www.dti.gov.uk/files/file29688.pdf  
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estimated the number had increased to nearly 4 million electricity consumers and over 2 million gas 
consumers. How far this is a conscious decision by consumers to protect themselves from going into debt in 
the face of rising energy costs and how far consumers are falling into debt and have little choice but to accept 
a pre-payment meter is difficult to know. 
Table 3 shows that companies continue to exploit consumers. Pre-payment meter consumers pay about 13 
per cent on average more for their energy than direct debit consumers. If they remain with the former 
franchise suppliers – it might prove difficult to switch if they have accumulated debt, a likely reason for them 
using pre-payment meters - they will pay 36 per cent more than the cheapest deal. How far this differential 
reflects the costs incurred by suppliers is impossible to know now that prices are unregulated. However, 
targeting the best prices to those that pay by direct debit makes commercial sense, because it will tend to 
target richer consumers who are likely to consume more and who have the resources and skills to identify the 
best deals. 
Table 3.  Energy prices for residential consumers in London, August 2006 (£/annum) 
 Direct debit+internet Direct debit Standard credit Prepayment 
British Gas - 918 1000 1035 
EDF - 817 859 891 
Npower - 849 912 964 
Powergen 794 812 865 947 
Scottish Power 901 917 999 1016 
Scottish&Southern - 810 857 935 
Mean 847 854 915 965 
Incumbents - 998 1079 1079 
Source: http://www.energywatch.org.uk/help_and_advice/saving_money/index.asp  
Notes 
1. Prices are for a residential consumer in London consuming a „medium‟ amount of energy per year (3300kWh of 
electricity and 20500kWh of gas) on a „dual fuel‟ offer except for pre-payment meter users. 
2. Figures were published in August 2006 but do not include price rises announced by EDF, British Gas and Powergen 
announced in June, July and August. 
3. The row marked „Incumbents‟ refers to consumers who have not switched from the previous incumbent supplier, in 
this case, British Gas for gas and EDF for electricity. 
While the government, Ofgem (regulator) and Energywatch (statutory consumer body) recommend those on 
pre-payment meters to move to cheaper forms of payment, it is clear that such consumers often value the 
assurance that a serious debt cannot be run up that a pre-payment meter offers, while there have been 
problems for consumers with debt moving to cheaper suppliers. 
For all payment methods, not switching from the incumbents is the worst option, generally costing on 
average about 16 per cent more than switching to the cheapest supplier. Clearly, supplying an existing 
consumer is not more expensive than supplying a new consumer, it is cheaper, so charging a higher price for 
existing consumers can only be seen as exploiting unfairly the inertia of existing consumers. 
From a narrow individual perspective therefore, the advice to switch regularly is good advice, although as 
illustrated in the Box, the process of switching can be tedious and there can be little assurance that over the 
period until the consumer switches again that they will have saved money. 
However, from a societal point of view, the advice to switch is far more questionable. If all consumers 
switched regularly, the costs spread over all consumers would be large and far outweigh any benefits of the 
competitive pressure this will place on retailers. From a strategic point of view, there would be serious 
consequences if the residential market became as mobile as the industrial market where consumers switch or 
renegotiate annually. Suppliers would not be able to predict their market share more than a year or two ahead 
and would therefore be unable to sign credible long-term gas or power purchase agreements making 
developing new production facilities even more risky and expensive – costs of course ultimately born by 
consumers. 
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Changing energy supplier in the UK: The author’s experience 
On July 4 2006, I moved house. Previously I had been supplied by Powergen (E.ON) under a dual fuel offer 
operated via an internet account and paid using a monthly direct debit. This had been selected as the cheapest 
available offer several months before. The supply at my new house was via EDF, which owns the previous 
incumbent retailer, and under the UK rules, I was obliged, at least initially, to buy my energy from EDF. At the time 
of my move, Powergen was offering a cheaper deal than EDF, so I asked Powergen to transfer the gas and 
electricity supply at my new house from EDF to Powergen. On July 26, the transfer of the gas supply was 
completed, although the final settlement to EDF for the gas used in the previous three weeks was still in dispute six 
weeks later because EDF had only estimates of the meter readings, which were grossly inaccurate. A revised bill 
was eventually sent, but this included gas consumed after the transfer was completed, so another revised bill had to 
be sent 
However, EDF refused the transfer of the electricity supply claiming that Powergen had not supplied all the relevant 
„supply numbers‟ (the codes associated with each meter). After about 90 minutes on the phone in various queues, it 
emerged that the missing information might be for an „off-peak‟ meter that no longer exists. The house had 
previously been heated by electric storage radiators but these had been removed when central heating was installed 
at least four years ago, the meter was removed and the account associated with the meter was closed. This was 
explained to both EDF and Powergen in further lengthy phone calls, but EDF refused the transfer on a further three 
occasions apparently because of continuing confusion with the non-existent meter and eight weeks later, the transfer 
was still not complete. Each time EDF refused the transfer, it was incumbent on me to phone EDF to try to 
determine what the problem was. 
In the meantime, following the announcement of reduced profits for its UK business, E.ON announced Powergen 
would be increasing its gas and electricity charges by 18.4 per cent and 9.7 per cent respectively. In July, EDF 
announced increases to its gas and electricity charges of 19 per cent and 8 per cent and British Gas announced 
increases to its charges of 12.4 per cent and 9.4 per cent. In September, Npower announced price rises of 17.2 per 
cent and 9.9 per cent for its gas and electricity. The various cost comparison web-sites available had not all included 
these higher charges in their web-sites at the time of writing, so it is not clear yet what the relative position of 
Powergen is to the other suppliers, but simple calculations suggest that the cheapest deals are all with the two 
companies that did not increase their prices in after July 1. It remains to be seen whether these two companies will 
be cheaper in the long-term or whether they are also about to increase their prices. 
If it turns out that Powergen is now more expensive than its competitors, the advice from the regulator (Ofgem), the 
government and from the consumer representation body (Energywatch) is to switch again. Under the UK rules, 
consumers are able to switch again after 28 days. It is highly likely that by the time a second switch was completed 
or soon after, new price changes would mean that my choice of supplier is no longer the cheapest. If I am only 
prepared to switch supplier, say, every 18 months (much more often than the average even for habitual switchers), I 
can have little confidence that the supplier I choose, on the basis that it is the cheapest supplier on a given date, will 
turn out to be the cheapest over the entire period until I switch again. 
There would seem to be at least four important lessons from this experience: 
 Small consumers cannot choose the cheapest supplier of energy over more than a month or two forward; 
 The software for transferring consumers between suppliers in the UK is a shambles. The extra costs this 
inefficiency imposes will inevitably be borne by all consumers, mostly by the majority of consumers, who 
never switch supplier. The process of switching can be tedious and time-consuming, especially if things do 
not go as smoothly as they ought and is likely to dissuade consumers from switching as often as they would 
need to in order to get the best deals; 
 Consumers will quickly become disillusioned with the process of switching if, soon after completing the 
transfer (or perhaps even before), their chosen supplier raises their prices; and 
 Even where switching can make savings for consumers, those able to take advantage of this are likely to be 
richer consumers (with orderly bank accounts that can use direct debits) with the time and skills (easy 
access and competence with the internet) to exploit the system. Those for whom a cheap energy supply is 
most important, are unlikely to be able to exploit the possibilities to their advantage, especially if they use 
pre-payment meters. In short, retired professionals with good internet skills will do well while hard-
working families on low incomes will not. 
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6. Market concentration 
Since the EPSU report was published, there have been several significant developments. 
6.1. Endesa 
In September 2005, Gas Natural, Spain‟s largest gas company, launched a takeover bid for Endesa, Spain‟s 
largest electricity company, valuing the company at €22.5bn. This clearly raised concerns about 
concentration in the Spanish energy market and was also opposed by Endesa. In July 2006, the European 
Court of First Instance on Friday upheld an earlier decision by the European Commission on a complaint 
brought by Endesa that the decision should be taken at EC level that the EC did not have the jurisdiction to 
rule on this proposed takeover. The Court found that it was a matter for Spanish anti-trust authorities because 
most the merged group‟s activities would be in Spain. 
In the meantime, a bid was placed by the German company, E.ON valuing the company at €27bn. It became 
clear that the Spanish government favoured the Gas Natural bid, widely interpreted as an unwillingness to 
lose a Spanish „national champion‟ company, by allowing Endesa to fall into foreign hands. The European 
Commission cleared the E.ON bid in April 2006. For its part, Endesa seemed to favour the E.ON group 
subject to the condition that the bid was high enough to maximise the benefits for its own shareholders. 
In July 2006, the Spanish energy regulatory body, CNE, announced that it would require 19 conditions to be 
met for it to approve the deal. The CNE‟s competence was only expanded to allow it to rule on these matters 
after the Gas Natural bid was placed. The CNE‟s conditions would require E.ON to sell off Endesa assets 
equal to about one-third of the target's Spanish energy capacity. 
Both E.ON and Endesa filed appeals in Spain against the regulator's ruling on the E.ON bid and the EC 
requested further information on the CNE‟s ruling. The Spanish government in August sent its official 
response to the Commission's request for more information on the ruling. The EU could open an 
infringement procedure if it deems the Spanish ruling violates free movement of capital under EU rules. By 
August 2006, the Commission had not responded to the Spanish government‟s explanations. By August 
2006, it was clear that the ownership of Endesa would not be resolved quickly and might take a further two 
years to finalise. 
In September 2006, the prime ministers of Spain met the German Chancellor met to discuss a mutually 
acceptable deal to resolve the issue, expected to involve the sale of about 25 per cent of Endesa‟s Spanish 
assets, somewhat less than the Spanish regulator was asking for. The Commission was very perturbed by this 
process and a spokesman for the Competition Directorate was quoted as saying: „'If member states interpret 
and resolve issues of community law on a bilateral basis, the risk is that the single market and the Union as a 
whole would descend into chaos‟26 In mid-September 2006, the Competition Commissioner, Neelie Kroes, 
said she would decide by the end of September whether the Spanish government had violated competition 
rules by imposing conditions on the planned acquisition by E.ON of Endesa. 
6.2. Suez/Electrabel 
In early 2006, rumours of an impending takeover bid for Suez by ENEL led to a counter proposal of a 
merger between Suez and the largest French gas company Gaz de France. ENEL was previously the 
dominant state-owned Italian electricity company, but it has been progressively broken up and privatised. It 
now owns about 50 per cent of Italy‟s generation (down from about 80 per cent), much of the network has 
been hived off and government‟s share is down to 32 per cent. GDF was also fully state-owned until August 
2005, when the government sold off 20 per cent of the shares. Suez is a diversified investor owned group 
operating mainly in electricity, gas and water and is owned by French interests. Its largest electricity business 
is Electrabel, the dominant company in the Belgian electricity sector, in gas, it owns the largest Belgian gas 
company, Distrigas, while in water its main business is in France (formerly known as Lyonnaise des Eaux). 
In response to ENEL‟s rumoured bid, a proposal to merge Suez and GDF was announced by the French 
prime minister, Dominique Villepin. This was greeted with hostility by the Italian government which 
characterised the merger as protectionist. ENEL‟s bid has never materialised but it is monitoring the situation 
and could still step in if the Suez/GDF merger is not completed 
                                                     
26 AFX International Focus, September 8, 2006. 
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As with the Endesa takeover, the deal is far from complete. Some of the uncertainties include: whether the 
French parliament would pass the legislation necessary to reduce the minimum state holding from 70 per 
cent, as now required, to 35 per cent; whether the whole of the Suez group would be involved in the merged 
company or whether the water business would be hived off; what the results of a European Commission in-
depth investigation into the merger, announced in June 2006, will be; whether if the merger fails, ENEL 
would formally launch a bid and whether it would include Electrabel or the whole of the Suez group. The 
deal is not expected to be completed soon and the Commission decision will not be for 90 working days 
(October 25, 2006) from announcement of the inquiry. 
In September 2006, it was reported that the European Commission had confirmed that it told the French 
government it could legally keep a 'golden share' in Gaz de France after the planned merger between GDF 
and Suez, a situation that would let the government continue to influence key decisions.27 This would mean 
that a company in which the French government owned a Golden Share would control strategic energy 
interests in Belgium. 
6.3. Centrica 
Since 2004, there has been continual speculation that Gazprom, the largest Russian gas company, has had an 
ambition to increase its share of the UK gas market to about 20 per cent by 2015, initially through supplying 
large consumers and power stations. It holds a 10 per cent stake in the gas interconnector that connects 
Britain to continental markets via Belgium. 
In January, its representatives seemed to suggest they were interested in buying a UK company was 
interested in buying a British company involved in gas supply. The deputy chairman, Alexander Medvedev 
stated: „We are aiming to secure 20pc of the (British) market by 2015. To start from scratch in retail would 
be impossible, but through acquisitions, yes, we do not rule this out.‟ This was interpreted as signalling a 
possible intention to bid for Centrica, a retail gas business. Alexander Shkuta, the deputy head of Gazprom's 
export arm, seemed to confirm interest in Centrica in February saying a bid for Centrica was „being analysed 
and under consideration‟.28 
The UK Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) responded saying „We are aware of speculation about 
possible Gazprom interest in Centrica. Security of energy supply to the UK's consumers is paramount. This 
has been achieved in the UK by being pro-competition and pro-liberalisation. An effective market has 
delivered for UK consumers and we've been pressing other EU member states to follow suit. But any new 
ownership would face robust scrutiny by the regulatory regime before entering that market.‟29 
By April, there were reports that the DTI was considering changes to the mergers and acquisitions regime in 
the UK to allow it to block takeover bids on grounds of security of supply30. These measures did not 
materialise. By August 2006, no bid had been made, but speculation about Gazprom‟s intentions to buy a 
UK energy company continued, although in June 2006, Gazprom did buy a small UK gas retailer, Pennine 
Natural Gas for an unspecified sum. Speculation continued in September about take-over bids for Centrica, 
with Norsk Hydro (Norway), Vattenfall (Sweden) and Shell mentioned as possible bidders as well as 
Gazprom. 
6.4. Essent/NUON 
The two largest electricity and gas companies in the Netherlands are Nuon and Essent, both currently owned 
by local authorities. The Dutch energy regulator supported by the Dutch government is pushing through 
measures requiring the ownership unbundling of the gas and electricity networks from the commercial 
businesses, although by August 2006, it was unclear whether these measures would command sufficient 
political support for this to be passed. In response, there has been considerable interest in takeovers and 
mergers with the commercial activities (generation and retail) of the main Dutch companies, especially 
Essent and Nuon. Centrica and RWE have been mentioned as possible bidders. In June 2006, management of 
the companies confirmed discussions were taking place but by August, a deal had not been completed. It is 
                                                     
27 AFX International Focus, September 8, 2006 
28 Press Association „Russian bid would face „robust scrutiny‟‟ February 2, 2006 
29 ibid 
30 Financial Times „Ministers resort to sabre rattling in face of Gazprom's advances Russian interest puts laissez faire 
approach to takeovers to test‟, April 17, 2006, p 2. 
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not clear what the attitude of the Dutch authorities including government, energy regulator and anti-trust 
authorities would be to such a merger. 
6.5. Analysis 
A number of common themes emerge from these somewhat diverse cases: 
 Most merger and acquisition activity is leading to even greater levels of concentration and is not 
being diluted by new entrants to the market. Many deals do not in themselves constitute a major 
concentration of the market, but the cumulative effect is to lead to a dangerously concentrated 
market. High barriers to entry to the sector mean these deals cannot be balanced by new entrants 
coming into the market providing fresh competition; 
 Security of supply is a major concern for governments and it does not seem that the introduction of 
market has diminished this concern. High fossil fuel prices, concerns about declining EU reserves of 
gas and worries about over-dependence on particular gas-supplying countries, especially Russia, 
have meant that security of energy supply is high on the political agenda in the Member States; 
 National ownership of major energy companies is still a major priority for many Member State 
governments. This is often portrayed by market advocates as crude protectionism for „national 
champion‟ companies, but this is simplistic and a belief that nationally owned companies will 
provide a higher level of security of supply than a foreign owned company; and 
 It is often far from clear whether a specific M&A proposal should be scrutinised at a national or EU 
level. Important deals are often not subject to major scrutiny because they do not constitute a large 
enough change at a national level or at an EU level but are a major concentration. For example, the 
proposed takeover of Endesa by E.ON would not seem to reduce competition in the Spanish market 
because E.ON is not present in the Spanish market while at the EU level, E.ON would still be far 
from having a dominant position. 
7. Quality of supply 
A key concern with the reforms required by the Directives was that the very high standards of security of 
supply, both for availability of energy and on the integrity of the network, generally provided under the 
existing industry structure should be maintained under the new regime. The adequacy of gas and electricity 
supplies is discussed in section XX, but here the quality of the networks is discussed. 
The issue of reliability of the networks is only briefly addressed and only for electricity in the DG TREN 
report and not at all in the DG Competition report. The report only looks at „average duration of interruption 
per year‟, one of many indicators now being calculated. The approach adopted by the regulators has been to 
impose performance standards on regulated companies. These standards can be divided into guaranteed 
standards applied to individual consumers and overall standards. The individual standards, for example, time 
taken to reconnect a consumer after a fault, are enforced usually by requiring companies to automatically 
compensate consumers on a pre-determined scale, whose service does not reach the specified standard. 
Overall standards, for example, „Minimum percentage of supplies to be connected, following faults, within 3 
hours‟, must be met by the company. The sanctions for failure to achieve the specified standard varies and 
may include fines or just adverse publicity, but may ultimately jeopardise the company‟s license. 
The PSIRU report for EPSU concluded: 
„More formal regulation has often been accompanied by the introduction of incentive regulation. Under this, the 
regulator pre-approves operations & maintenance spending and investment for a period of usually five years and if 
the company believes it can make savings against these projections, it can keep the savings as extra profits. This 
gives companies an incentive to operate the networks more efficiently but it also gives them an incentive to make 
short-term cost reductions. To counter the risk that the savings will be at the expense of system reliability, regulators 
are introducing performance standards that network owners must meet. These raise a number of issues: 
 Can performance indicators be an accurate enough measure of actual system reliability? In the UK, the 
regulator is now requiring network companies to install comprehensive system monitoring equipment to measure 
system reliability rather than partial performance indicators. 
 Will under-expenditure show up as poor performance before lasting damage is done to the infrastructure? In 
the UK rail industry, train punctuality was at a historic high before a series of accidents from 1999 onwards 
revealed the neglect of the system. It is expected to be about 2013 before punctuality levels return to those 
achieved in 1999. 
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 Will the rapid turnover of ownership in the electricity industry mean that owners will sell their stakes before 
the consequences of their actions are apparent? In Britain, ownership of the Eastern distribution network 
changed five times in a six-year period.‟ 
7.1. CEER 
The CEER issued its „Third annual benchmarking report on quality of electricity supply 2005‟ in December 
2005
31
. There is no equivalent document for gas. The report is divided into four main sections corresponding 
to the main groups of indicators. 
7.1.1. Continuity of supply 
Indicators covered under continuity of supply include: System Average Interruption Duration Index and 
System Average Interruption Frequency Index. The report concludes that for most countries, the number and 
duration of unplanned interruptions shows a downward trend. 
7.1.2. Quality regulation 
The area covered under quality regulation is mainly continuity standards. The report acknowledges that the 
use of incentive regulation will, if quality standards are not imposed, provide incentives to companies to 
reduce service quality because the savings made can be kept as extra profits. It suggests that quality 
standards, perhaps enforced by penalties/incentives might avoid this problem. It is the first time the CEER 
benchmarking report has covered this issue and no strong conclusions are drawn. 
7.1.3. Commercial quality 
Indicators covered under commercial quality include: connection of the customer to the network; customer 
complaints; and meter reading, billing. Measures include objective and subjective indicators (for example, 
opinion polls). The report found that the indicators used and the methods of enforcement vary widely 
between countries making comparisons difficult. The report does seem to recommend that automatic meter 
reading be introduced at least on a monthly basis (see below). 
7.1.4. Voltage quality 
This covers areas such as: supply voltage variations; flicker severity etc. This is also a relatively new issue 
for the CEER and the CEER does not identify any trends in performance. 
7.2. EURELECTRIC response to the CEER Benchmarking Report 
EURELECTRIC published a response to the CEER‟s report in May 200632. On continuity of supply, its main 
comments are on the need to harmonise data collection requirements to ensure comparisons are valid. On 
standards and incentives, EURELECTRIC states a preference for incentives over penalties, it also questions 
whether consumers really are demanding higher standards, especially if it increases prices. On standards of 
commercial quality, EURELECTRIC opposes the compulsory introduction of automatic metering. On 
voltage quality, EURELECTRIC opposes increases in required standard without a cost-benefit analysis. 
8. Regulatory independence, ownership and accountability of regulatory bodies 
Contributions from the two regulatory organisations, ERGEG and CEER leave a number of clear 
impressions, even if these are not always explicitly stated: 
 Regulators want to be fully insulated from government pressure; 
 Regulators want more resources and more power;  
 Regulators‟ decisions do not involve value judgements; and 
 Regulators prefer private to public ownership. 
                                                     
31 CEER (2005) „Third annual benchmarking report on quality of electricity supply 2005‟, C05-QOS-01-03 
CEER, Brussels. http://www.ceer-
eu.org/portal/page/portal/CEER_HOME/CEER_PUBLICATIONS/CEER_DOCUMENTS/2005/CEER_3RDBR-
QOES_2005-12-06.PDF  
32 EURELECTRIC (2006) „Union of the Electricity Industry – EURELECTRIC Comments on the CEER 3rd 
Benchmarking Report on Quality of Electricity Supply 2005‟ Eurelectric, Brussels. 
http://public.eurelectric.org/2/MAHBFKBBAKBHCCOLLMDKPCLPCY59VLOL5RVG5TR8MLIRGCIT5LVJ51RJF
YGD2YBDE37E3E9YBDE3P6A3BDBN9Y971KM/eurelectric/docs/DLS/82EURELECTRICCOMMENTSONCEER
REPORT24052006FINAL-2006-233-0006-2-.pdf  
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Whilst at least some of these impressions sound intuitively reasonable, closer examination suggests they are 
not as uncontroversial as they might seem. 
8.1. Representation and autonomy 
Few would disagree that regulators must be independent of the industry they regulate, that they should have 
the resources and expertise to carry out analyses in the same depth as the companies they regulate and that 
industry should not be able to evade the judgements of the regulator. However, should the regulator really be 
fully autonomous from government? 
Governments are elected by the public and therefore have democratic legitimacy. In the USA, regulatory 
bodies are also elected in some cases, but this does not happen in Europe, where decision-makers in 
regulatory bodies are generally appointed by government. This raises the issue, how representative are 
regulatory bodies and who should they be accountable to? 
8.1.1. Representation 
Typically, the decision-making bodies within the regulatory agencies are dominated by business interests 
with no more than a token presence of other interests. For example, of the five-person executive board of the 
UK‟s Gas and Electricity Markets Authority, four have a predominantly business background and one has a 
background in government. This suggests a perception that regulatory decisions can be made on purely 
techno-economic grounds with little or no value judgement. This is of course far from the case. Regulatory 
decisions have social and environmental dimensions and for regulatory bodies to be well-balanced and 
representative, interests such as consumers, trade unionists, environmentalists and those working in social 
welfare need to be represented at the highest level. 
Regulatory processes are generally open in principle, but the volume of material produced and its technical 
nature of it mean that discussions are closed to all but major corporate interests, i.e., energy companies and 
large users. In the UK, there is little evidence that the publicly funded energy consumer body, Energywatch, 
interacts to any significant extent with the regulator, Ofgem, for its major decisions. If the public is to have 
confidence in regulatory bodies, they must work much harder to engage the public in their decisions. 
Regulators also adopt a rather sanctimonious attitude to politicians. For example, on funding, ERGEG states: 
„Furthermore many regulators‟ budgets are part of the state budget and have to be negotiated with the relevant 
ministries. This might imply a regular dependence of regulators on ministries‟ good will and therefore undermine 
independence.‟ 
And on ownership: 
„the government or ministry may choose not to follow the proposal prepared by the NRA. This could be for political 
objectives such as protecting state-owned incumbents that are soon to be privatized.‟ 
To imply that politicians‟ motives tend to cynical while regulators never have other agendas is hard to 
justify. The public perception of regulators is not helped by the cases of regulators moving to highly paid 
jobs in the industries they previously regulated. 
8.1.2. Autonomy 
On the issue of budgets, whether the regulator‟s budget is taken from the state budget or from consumers, as 
is normally the case, the amount allocated clearly should be subject of independent scrutiny – it would 
clearly not be appropriate for regulators to unilaterally decide on their budget. A democratically elected 
government is surely the most appropriate body to make this decision. If regulators feel they have to curry 
favour with ministers in order to get an adequate budget, they should have the integrity to alert the public to 
the situation and, if necessary, resign. 
ERGEG and CEER complain that in some countries, regulatory decisions are only advisory. ERGEG writes: 
„First there are situations where the decisions are only prepared by regulators, but the government then takes the 
decision itself. Secondly there are situations where the decisions are taken by the public authority itself and the 
government has – under certain conditions – the right to overrule this decision. In the first case regulators only 
advise on the decision and the government or ministry may choose not to follow the proposal prepared by the NRA. 
This could be for political objectives such as protecting state-owned incumbents that are soon to be privatized.‟  
And 
[Regulators must] be independent of Governments in exercising their regulatory powers, especially where the State 
controls parts of the industry. In some Member States key regulatory decisions are shared with or taken (or subject 
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to overrule) by Governments. Such Government control risks undermining economic principles and bringing 
regulatory uncertainty to the market, inhibiting investment and market confidence. 
This displays a misguided set of priorities. The objective of the regulators is to ensure consumers receive a 
reliable, affordable and environmentally acceptable supply of electricity. Adhering to „market principles‟ and 
retaining „market confidence‟ might be means to achieve this objective, but they are not worthwhile 
objectives in themselves. Regulators must be more aware of the free market, private sector values that is 
influencing their decisions. If they choose to make decisions on narrow grounds of „market principles‟, they 
should expect that governments, which must keep a broader perspective, including social and environmental 
issues must reserve the right to override their decisions in the interests of maximising social welfare. 
9. Will liquid markets inevitably lead to consumer price volatility? 
Most reports stress the need for liquid wholesale markets as essential if market signals are going to stimulate 
investment in new supplies of gas and new generating capacity. However, apart from capacity release 
schemes, there are few ideas about how this might be achieved, other than rather unspecific calls for greater 
transparency and greater regulatory consistency. In the case of gas, capacity release schemes require 
dominant companies to release to the market some of the gas they have contracted long-term, while for 
electricity, they require dominant generators to release capacity to the market, at least short-term. 
If the lack of liquidity is due to a „Catch 22‟ that they are not trusted because the prices are not reliable and 
prices are not reliable because they are not trusted, this might „kick-start‟ the markets by forcing liquidity. 
However, if there are fundamental reasons, for example that new investments cannot be financed on the basis 
of prices in an unpredictable spot market, the liquidity will be temporary. However, if we make the 
assumption that liquid wholesale gas and electricity markets can be created, how stable will prices be? 
All experience suggests that prices will be highly volatile for a number of reasons. First, for many 
consumers, short term price elasticity of demand is very low. In other words, when consumers need 
electricity or gas, for example, to operate industrial machinery, power shops and offices, provide heat and 
light on cold evenings their need is immediate and unavoidable. Shops cannot choose not to open just 
because the weather is cold and it is highly undesirable that small consumers should not heat their homes in 
cold conditions. So if the margin between capacity and demand is small, the wholesale price is likely to rise 
very steeply because the market cannot respond quickly to price signals. This was clearly demonstrated in 
California (albeit that the shortage was artificially created) in 2000 and in the Nordic markets in 2002/03. 
Of course, in a monopoly market, the cost of meeting peaks in demand is also high because little used 
sources, such as peak generators have to be used. However, a monopoly utility can plan to have the optimum 
amount of capacity available that strikes an agreed balance between security of supply and cost. Also the 
price of peak power will be priced according to cost; it will not include a scarcity premium. 
While wholesale markets have little liquidity and power purchase agreements are not strongly indexed to 
spot prices, the impact of such price spikes on consumers will be limited. However, the NordPool is liquid, 
most contracts are indexed to the spot price and consumer prices usually pass through wholesale price rises 
to consumers. This meant that small consumers had to face high energy prices on cold winter days and 
industry not protected by long-term contracts outside the market (see section 11) had to pay huge increases in 
the price of one of their main costs. In California, electricity retailers were not allowed to pass on price rises 
to consumers and were quickly effectively bankrupted. 
So while creating liquid wholesale markets is a logical objective in narrow market terms, achieving it will 
almost certainly lead to greater volatility in prices. For energy intensive industry, unpredictable energy prices 
would be intolerable: management would not know from hour to hour whether producing metals, chemicals, 
paper etc would be profitable. For small consumers, the social impact of exposing especially poor consumers 
to high prices at times when they need energy most would high. 
10. Is automatic metering for all desirable? 
If a wholesale market exists, logically, prices for final consumers should be related to those prices to give 
them signals about the costs they are incurring and to ensure that their suppliers are able to recover the costs 
they incur – this was not possible in California and the retail companies were quickly bankrupted. 
Since the wholesale price typically changes every 30 minutes or every hour, logically, this requires the use of 
„smart meters‟ so that energy retailers know how much their consumers have used in each 30 minute or hour 
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period. Smart meter technology is well proven and the meters themselves are cheap to buy, but transmitting 
and processing the data is much more expensive. For large consumers, and in the UK, these costs fell 
initially but „plateaued‟ at several hundred pounds per year. Such a sum is feasible for consumers with 
electricity bills of tens of thousands of pounds per year, but prohibitive for small and residential consumers. 
As a result, no country with retail electricity competition for residential consumers has installed smart meters 
for small consumers. 
The normal solution to this is the use of profiling. Under this, consumer meters are ready, as previously, 
perhaps quarterly and it is assumed that the demand profile is the same for all consumers so the three months 
of consumption is allocated to each 30 minute period in the three months. As argued in the earlier EPSU 
report33, this is a very poor solution neither allocating demand accurately nor giving consumers price signals. 
So far, in most cases, large consumers have not been exposed to the potential volatility of wholesale prices 
because of the lack of liquidity of wholesale markets has meant that their energy suppliers are buying most 
of their energy on long-term contracts not sensitive to spot prices. Large users have been able to use their 
smart meters to make small adjustments to their demand pattern saving money for themselves and their 
energy suppliers. Some even have interruptible contracts that allow their supplier to interrupt supply in return 
for lower prices if it is expected that the market price of power will be high. 
However, without the insulation that long-term power purchase and gas purchase agreements provide, the 
effect of these smart meters would be much less benign. If we assume that these cost issues can be overcome, 
what would be the impact of smart meters on residential consumers? There is much facile discussion of 
intelligent appliances operating only when energy prices are low, for example, washing machines turning 
themselves on at 3.00AM. Leaving aside the issue of how many people want a noisy machine operating in 
the middle of the night, will such effects have any impact? 
The response to price signals can either be to postpone or to forego demand. For example, freezers can be 
switched off (perhaps automatically) for an hour or two if prices are high. This is useful in reducing the 
overall cost of supplying electricity to the nation as long as demand is being shifted from a „peak‟ to a 
„trough‟. Once the trough has been filled, shifting demand any more will be counterproductive because it 
will be creating a new peak. The difference between peaks and troughs an hour or two is generally quite 
small and it is far from clear that the ability to „shift‟ more demand than can already be done through 
interruptible contracts and other price signals would be useful. In addition, most residential energy demand is 
not postponable. Demand for energy for appliances such as televisions, lighting, heating and cooking cannot 
realistically be postponed. 
To have a real impact on the electricity industry‟s costs, demand has to be forgone, not just shifted to another 
time. To persuade consumers to forego consumption would neither be easy nor desirable. To produce prices 
so high that consumers would be persuaded not to heat their houses or cook their food would require very 
high prices and would have serious social consequences if poor consumers were not able to keep themselves 
warm and fed in cold weather. 
Like liquid markets, smart meters are a logical step in narrow market terms but the social and industrial 
consequences they would generate if wholesale markets were liquid enough and if the resulting price 
volatility was passed through to consumers would probably be unacceptable. Smart meters may have a place 
in a regulated system, encouraging small shifts in demand patterns to smooth out peaks and troughs in 
demand but in a market system, they are dangerous. 
11. Can a market ensure security of supply? 
This is perhaps the ultimate test for the reforms required under the Directives. If the reformed system cannot 
match the secure supplies of energy that the previous regulated system offered, it will have failed. 
Experience in the Nord Pool, widely acknowledged to be the most competitive wholesale electricity market 
in the world, with liquidity in excess of 30 per cent is particularly interesting.34 Demand is strongly seasonal 
                                                     
33 S Thomas (2005) „The European Union Gas and Electricity Directives‟, EPSU, Brussels., p 70. 
http://www.epsu.org/IMG/pdf/Report_EN_Directive_review_final.pdf  
34 For further information on the Nordic reforms, see A Midttun (1997) „The Norwegian, Swedish and Finnish reforms: 
Competitive public capitalism and the emergence of the Nordic internal market‟ in A Midttun (ed) (1997) „European 
electricity systems in transition: a comparative analysis of policy and regulation in Western Europe‟ Elsevier, Oxford 
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due to the dominance of electric space-heating in Norway. Peak prices are usually in December or January 
and lowest prices are usually in July. Prices are also heavily influenced by precipitation, particularly in 
Norway. Availability of power in Norway could be more than 50 per cent higher in a wet year than in a dry 
year and if at the end of summer, levels in reservoirs are low, prices could be high and equally if there has 
been a warm, wet winter, prices in January could be low. 
In 1996, prices were at a historic peak, nearly three times the level they were at in 1993, but declined over 
the next four years before beginning to rise slowly to mid-2002 (see Table 4). From July to December 2002, 
however, prices rose by a factor of more than 5 to a peak of NOK550/MWh (€66/MWh). Prices fell 
somewhat after then but remained at levels near the 1996 peak until winter 2005, when prices began to rise, 
continuing to rise after the winter had finished. By August, prices were near the peak levels of 2002/03, 
about 75 per cent higher than the previous August high. This was only partly the result of problems with the 
Swedish nuclear sector that resulted in the unplanned closure of two units at the end of July, but even before 
this, prices were around NOK400/MWh in July, 60 per cent higher than in any previous July. 
Table 4.  Elspot monthly price in Oslo (NOK/MWh) 
 Highest monthly price Lowest monthly price Yearly average/ 3 year rolling average 
1996 342.96 (Sep) 186.03 (Jan) 256.70 
1997 227.62 (Jan) 87.57 (Jul) 137.45 
1998 163.28 (Jan) 49.81 (Aug) 115.86 / 170.00 
1999 140.54 (Dec) 53.98 (Jul) 109.20 / 120.83 
2000 135.15 (Dec) 48.61 (Jul) 97.70   / 107.58 
2001 220.23 (Oct) 150.75 (Feb) 185.95 / 130.95 
2002 550.14 (Dec) 108.14 (Jul) 198.49 / 160.71 
2003 532.56 (Jan) 195.99 (Jun) 293.93 / 226.12 
2004 273.68 (Aug) 215.68 (Dec) 246.06 / 246.16 
2005 272.19 (Dec) 188.21 (Jan) 233.12 / 257.70 
2006 311.41 (May) 533.10 (Aug) 385.39 / 288.19 
Source: http://www.nordpool.com/  
Note: In September 2006, €1=NOK8.3 
Previous periods of high prices had relatively little impact on Norwegian electric-intensive industry. In 1992: 
„The Government explicitly exempted heavy industry from the reform, and the practice of giving energy intensive 
industry politically guaranteed prices through special contracts continued. Stortinget (parliament) thus approved of a 
new round of contracts in 1992, running to year 2010. For about a third of the power produced in Norway, the 
market reform, therefore, had little or no impact.‟35 
As these contracts near their conclusion, it will be instructive to see how Norwegian electric-intensive 
industry responds. It is inconceivable that electric-intensive industry could operate successfully when the 
price paid for electricity could vary by a factor of more than three from day to day. By contrast, Norwegian 
residential consumers, who have high winter bills and whose prices are more directly related to the spot 
market than in the other Nordic countries were hard hit in 2002/03 and unless prices fall sharply soon, face 
even higher bills in winter 2006/07.36 
The factor that seems to be underlying the increased frequency and severity of price spikes in the Nordic 
market is the lack of investment in new generating capacity since liberalisation, in 1991 in Norway and from 
1997 onwards in the other Nordic countries. 
The suggestion that markets would provide investment price signals seems highly implausible. In 1996, 
prices were at a historic high, surely a clear signal of the need for investment, yet only a year later, prices 
were only a third of those a year earlier. In Britain in 1997/98, the expectation of future high wholesale 
prices led to a huge wave of ordering, but by the time these plants were coming on stream, the wholesale 
price had collapsed leaving 40 per cent Britain‟s generating capacity in the ownership of essentially bankrupt 
                                                                                                                                                                                
and A Midttun & S Thomas (1998 „Theoretical ambiguity and the weight of historical heritage: a comparative study of 
the British and Norwegian electricity liberalisation‟ Energy Policy, Vol. 26, No. 3, pp. 179-197. 
35 A Midttun & S Thomas (1998 „Theoretical ambiguity and the weight of historical heritage: a comparative study of 
the British and Norwegian electricity liberalisation‟ Energy Policy, Vol. 26, No. 3, p. 193. 
36 D Finon, T A Johnsen, & A Midttun, (2004) „Challenges when electricity markets face the investment phase‟, Energy 
Policy, 32 (2004) 1355–1362 
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companies. Financiers are unlikely to lend money to build a plant, designed to last for 30 years or more on 
the basis of a price signal that might last only a month or two and is highly likely not to apply by the time a 
new plant enters service.  
Any plant genuinely exposed to the market, in other words, without long-term guarantees of the volume of 
sales and the price that would be paid could not be financed or would attract such a large risk premium on 
borrowing as to be uneconomic. The ways of reducing this risk, such as long-term power purchase 
agreements at priced unrelated to the market price, or construction by a strong/dominant integrated 
generator/retailer all effectively by-pass the market. 
If there is no major new investment in the Nordic region in the next year or two, it is likely that the Nordic 
region will suffer increasingly frequent and severe price spikes. Ironically, the one possibility that might 
avoid this is if electric-intensive industry closes freeing up spare capacity to supply the rest of the market. 
12. Conclusions 
The fundamental questions that must be asked in evaluating the Directives are: Can efficient, sustainable 
markets be created for the electricity and gas industries? And even if markets can be created, are the costs of 
running the industries on competitive lines less than the benefits of operating them in this way? Neither the 
DG TREN, nor the DG Competition is prepared even to acknowledge that these are legitimate questions and 
they both totally fail to address them. This report identifies a number of reasons why markets in electricity 
and gas might not be sustainable and why the costs of creating and running the markets might be higher than 
any conceivable benefits. 
If markets cannot be created, the standard pro-competition measures, such as breaking up dominant 
companies, forcing liquidity into markets will be counter-productive. Large, stable companies with strong 
capabilities, long-term strategies and good employment practices will be replaced by much less stable 
companies with little commitment to the long-term development of the sector. Liquid spot markets will make 
long-term investment so risky as to impose a substantial risk premium on investment costs, raising overall 
costs substantially. Liquid spot markets will also tend to generate a large amount of price volatility because 
prices will tend to collapse if there is a surplus and sky-rocket if there is a shortage. This will make life 
intolerable for consumers, especially electric-intensive industry and poor residential consumers, both of 
whom rely on predictable, affordable prices to survive. The introduction of automatic meters for residential 
consumers, to allow consumers to be charged rates more closely related to market prices and perhaps even 
time-of-day prices will expose consumers to even greater risk. Free markets will also make security of 
supply difficult to achieve because unless entry and exit to and from the market can be controlled, security of 
supply depends on a happy coincidence that just enough suppliers can remain profitable as are needed to 
ensure there is sufficient supply 
Consumers will judge the reforms on the perceived impact of the reforms on prices and on reliability of 
service. However, on prices, it is difficult for consumers to judge the impact because other factors, especially 
fossil fuel prices, will inevitably have a much larger impact on electricity prices than the way in which the 
industry is organised. While fossil fuel prices were falling, market advocates were happy to attribute the 
resulting reductions in electricity and gas prices to market liberalisation, but now that fossil fuel prices are 
much higher, the resulting consumer price rises are attributed either to external factors or to imperfections in 
the market, rather than any fundamental problems with the market. If the Commission is to make claims on 
the impact of liberalisation on prices, this can only be supported if a rigorous counter-factual is presented, in 
other words, an analysis of what would have happened to prices in the absence of any reforms. 
Regulatory bodies have failed in their duty to engage with the public. They remain aloof and 
unrepresentative of the broad range of interests that are concerned about energy prices. Much of their 
argumentation seems to be based on a misapprehension that their judgements can be value-free technical 
judgements that have no political content 
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Annex Why free markets in gas and electricity might not be achievable 
1. Inability to store power and expense of storing gas. Storing products allows consumers and 
producers to smooth out demand and price peaks by drawing down stores when prices are high and 
building stores when prices are low; 
2. Need for supply and demand to match at all times. In an electricity system, supply and demand 
must always match if the whole system is not to collapse. Without control over producers, a system 
operator does not have the tools to ensure security of supply. A free market implies free entry and 
exit and does not oblige producers to offer their products to the market. For gas, the requirement for 
supply and demand to match is not quite so stringent but still strong; 
3. Lack of substitutes. For most products, there are ready substitutes that can be used if supplies are 
scarce or prices are high. The threat of switching to substitutes acts as a discipline on producers on 
price and availability. For many uses, electricity has no ready substitutes and even where substitution 
is theoretically possible, consumers are generally locked in to electricity by the equipment they use. 
For gas, there are substitutes in some cases, albeit not so convenient but users are again often locked 
in to gas by the equipment they use; 
4. Vital role in modern society. Modern society is now dependent on reliable supplies of electricity 
for it to function. A failure of the electricity system will lead to immediate and serious welfare and 
economic impacts, as the blackouts of 2003 amply demonstrated. For most products, a market failure 
can be mitigated by use of substitutes and stores but this is not possible for electricity. As a result, 
the demand for electricity cannot easily be influenced in the short-term by price changes. The furore 
caused by shortfall of Russian gas supplies; 
5. Electricity and gas are standard products. In an interconnected network, electricity and gas are 
standard products. Switching to another supplier cannot produce „better‟ electricity or gas, so 
markets are purely price driven and will be exploited by those who have most to gain by cheaper 
power (large users) as well as the skills and negotiating power to get the best deal. If the market is 
functioning well, prices will inevitably be driven down to the short-run marginal cost, too low a level 
to justify new investment; and 
6. Environmental impacts. The environmental impact of electricity generation and gas use must be 
added to the traditional list of special features. Electricity generation and gas combustion play key 
roles in greenhouse gas emissions and attempts to deal with climate change have to focus on the 
electricity and gas sector (and transport). The market will not deliver the necessary emissions 
reductions and market mechanisms are no more than one of many tools that will have to be used, not 
the complete answer. 
